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ABSTRACT 
Health concerns about overconsumption of large portions apply to a wide range of highly 
calorific foods and drinks.  Yet, amongst all products, sugar-sweetened soft drinks and especially 
sugared soda are the ones which seem to raise the most ire because they contain little or no 
nutritional value beyond their sugar content and because of the way that vendors encourage 
excessive consumption by pricing jumbo-size portions to look like bargains while making 
smaller portions appear overpriced.  This paper considers the logic of such extreme value size 
pricing and reveals why this marketing practice can harm economic welfare beyond public health 
concerns.  The paper shows why policy interventions, including portion cap rules and soda taxes, 
seeking to reduce portion sizes and curb the consumption of large-size sugary drinks might fail 
when they do not fully take into account or appreciate the strategic responses that vendors might 
adopt to retain value size pricing. 
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Containing Big Soda: Countering Inducements to Buy Large-Size Sugary Drinks 
1. Introduction 
Menus with different portion sizes can pose a dilemma for consumers.  Consumers like 
choice but choosing between options often involves weighing up complex trade-offs. Faced with 
the choice between buying sugared soda at $1.79 for a 16-ounce cup or $2.39 for a 32-ounce cup, 
which one should the consumer buy?  The smaller one might be enough to quench your thirst, 
but the larger one offers much more for the money.  The larger one might boost your energy 
levels and make you feel more satiated, but the smaller one has only half the calories and can 
help keep your weight in check.  In weighing up these trade-offs you might be leaning towards 
buying the smaller one, but would you choose differently if instead the respective prices were 
$1.79 and $1.99?  You could, of course, consider buying the larger size but have in mind not 
consuming all of it, but are you sure that you will keep to this intention once you start drinking?  
Relative prices can influence the portion size choice and tip the scales one way or the other 
because all consumers seek value for money from purchases.  However, the differences between 
consumers in their perceptions of the value on offer helps explain why this choice is presented in 
the first place.  The vendor would not offer different sizes if all consumers thought the same 
way, other than using one size as a decoy to frame the offer price on another size and capture all 
the sales.  Yet, consumers do differ in how they evaluate the value on offer and also at different 
times according to their changing needs and moods.  How best then should the vendor price 
different sizes to appeal to different sorts or moods of consumers?  The evident answer, as clear 
from its ubiquitous application amongst food and drinks vendors, is by the judicious use of 
quantity discounts with so-called value size pricing (also known as non-linear pricing or 
supersized pricing) in structuring prices such that the per unit cost (e.g., price per ounce) 
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decreases as portion size increases (NANA, 2002; Harnack & French, 2003; Haws & Winterich, 
2013). Value size pricing can be a profitable strategy even to the point of selling different sizes 
with virtually no price difference (Dobson & Gerstner, 2010).  
Bargain offers on large sizes can be irresistible to some consumers and require real 
determination and discipline for others to turn down alluring offers and stick to a smaller size.  
Resistance becomes harder the bigger is the discount, but equally the less healthy the product 
then the greater might consumers try to resist, encouraging the vendor to be even more generous 
with the size discount.  Accordingly, consumers might find the greatest size discounts on the 
least healthy kinds of foods and drinks.  Value-seeking consumers might welcome the offer of 
large quantities of tasty food and drink at bargain prices.  Unfortunately, though, the health 
consequences for the individual and in aggregate for society could be dire if excessive 
consumption leads to obesity and ill-health arising from a poor diet. Indeed, the consumption of 
excessive portion sizes appear to be a significant contributory factor to the alarming rise in 
obesity levels and resulting healthcare costs to society (Young & Nestle, 2002; Rolls, 2003; 
Steenhuis & Vermeer, 2009; Chandon & Wansink, 2011) and the availability of enlarged portion 
sizes encourages overconsumption (Zlatevska, Dubelaar, & Holden, 2014; Hollands, Shemilt, 
Marteau, Jebb, Lewis, Wei, Higgins, & Ogilvie, 2015). 
Morgan Spurlock’s 2004 documentary Super Size Me drew considerable public attention to 
the health dangers associated with supersizing portions sizes and the upsizing selling methods of 
McDonalds.  Despite McDonalds subsequently withdrawing supersize portions, much of the 
eating out sector continues to use value size pricing and quantity discounting on large portion 
sizes across a wide range of prepared foods and beverages (NANA, 2002; Nestle & Young, 
2007; Wu & Sturm, 2013).   
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Health concerns apply to overconsumption on a wide range of highly calorific foods and 
drinks, but sugar-sweetened soft drinks are now the primary target for policymakers seeking to 
stem the obesity crisis (Nestle, 2015).  This paper focuses on these products and considers why 
vendors use value size pricing, why this pricing practice might harm economic welfare beyond 
public health concerns about excessive consumption, and whether particular policy measures are 
likely to be effective in altering the choices presented to consumers to allow for reduced 
consumption and improved economic welfare. 
2. Policy Issues and Research Challenges 
Sugar-sweetened beverages have a range of healthcare concerns beyond general obesity-
related medical conditions, including diabetes and dental decay. A 20-ounce soda contains 
around 17 teaspoons of sugar and upwards of 240 calories, while a 64-ounce fountain cola drink 
could have up to 700 calories (Nestle, 2015).  Research shows that people who drink sugary 
drinks do not feel as full as if they had eaten the same calories from solid food and do not 
compensate by eating less (Pan & Hu, 2011).  The single-largest source of calories in the 
American diet in 2010 was sugary drinks, accounting for 46% of all added sugars consumed, 
while food and beverage companies spent more than $800 million for marketing sugary 
beverages in 2013 and U.S. households bought $14.3 billion worth of these products through 
stores alone (CSPI, 2015). While the average American buys a whopping 170 liters of soda in the 
course of a year, the U.S. is far from alone in having high per capita consumption and sugary 
drinks consumption is now a worldwide public health concern (Nestle, 2015). Globally, sugary 
drinks could be responsible for 184,000 deaths resulting from increased rates of type-2 diabetes, 
heart disease, and cancer (Singh, Micha, Khatibzadeh, Lim, Ezzati, & Mozaffarian, 2015).  
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Measures to rein in the consumption of sugary drinks are the subject of much policy 
debate.  The two most high profile contemplated measures are a large-size soda ban limiting the 
size of containers for sugary drinks (such as the unsuccessful attempt to introduce a Sugary 
Drinks Portion Cap Rule in New York City to limit cup sizes to a maximum of 16 fluid ounces), 
and a soda tax in the form of either a sales tax or a per unit excise tax applied to sugary drinks 
(with Britain and South Africa set to follow the lead of Mexico, France and Hungary).  Other 
proposals targeting consumption of large-size sugary drinks range from highly interventionist 
measures like direct price regulation to oblige vendors to use proportional pricing through to 
raising consumer awareness about the dangers of overconsumption through hard-hitting 
advertising campaigns and overt calorie labelling requirements (Chandon & Wansink, 2012). 
A critical issue in devising appropriate policy is to consider the strategic response by 
vendors to interventions which challenge their profitability.  This paper addresses this issue by 
modelling how a drinks vendor determines its size range and price structure.  The modelling 
shows why policy interventions may have non-linear effects and how accounting for vendor 
strategic responses can help ensure that measures achieve their intended purpose. 
Libertarians may take the view that public health policy interventions which interfere with 
the free market and individuals’ consumption choices amount to unnecessary nanny state 
interference.  Yet, obesity creates a social burden in raising healthcare costs which impact 
taxpayers and not just the individual (The Economist, 2012).  The negative externalities 
argument alone can give sufficient justification for public health interventions to tackle obesity.  
However, building on Dobson and Gerstner (2010), this paper provides a further reason on 
economic welfare grounds to justify policy interventions that specifically target the consumption 
of large-size sugary drinks.  This justification is because vendors may use value size pricing as 
an instrument to segment consumers in a fashion that is profitable even if the practice destroys 
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social value when the difference in willingness to pay for a large-size drink over a more 
moderate smaller size is less than the difference in supply costs.  The analysis here shows that 
policymakers should not underestimate the determination of vendors to profitably segment 
consumers and that poorly designed measures which do not fully take this aspect into account 
can damage rather than improve economic welfare.  
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows.  Section 3 sets out a parsimonious model to 
show why a vendor might use value-size pricing to sell sugary drinks.  Section 4 derives the 
vendor’s optimal selling strategy.  Section 5 shows why value size pricing can be socially 
inefficient even if privately profitable. Section 6 why policy interventions might not succeed in 
reducing consumption and improving economic welfare. Section 7 presents the conclusion. 
3. Model Set-Up 
The purpose of the model is to explore how a vendor might use different sizes of sugary 
drinks with different relative prices to target different consumer segments and then consider how 
policy measures might alter the vendor’s behavior and affect consumer choices.  The focus is on 
drinks for immediate consumption with purchase and consumption decisions closely aligned and 
in a simple setting where a profit maximizing vendor decides between offering one or two 
different sized drinks and how much to charge consumers for them.  The vendor could be any 
type eatery or outlet selling drinks in cups or glasses for immediate consumption.  
The vendor offers as a base choice a regular portion size (say, 16 ounces) that allows 
consumers to drink in moderation at a price p and at a unit cost of supply c.  In addition or 
alternatively, the vendor could offer a bigger size and decide on the price, P, for this large size 
(say, 32 or even 50 ounces) with unit cost of supply C.  If offering both sizes, the vendor 
determines the price difference for the large size over the regular size, denoting ∆p ≡ P – p, while 
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taking account of the unit cost difference, denoting ∆c ≡ C – c.   Other costs are fixed and do not 
affect the vendor’s decisions.  
The vendor faces two types of consumers:  Value-Conscious consumers and 1 –  Health-
Conscious consumers, where 0 <  < 1 so normalizing the total number of consumers to equal 
unity.  Denoting V as the Value-Conscious consumers and H as the Health-Conscious 
consumers, customers of type i, where i = V, H, are willing to pay ui for the standard regular size 
and Ui for the large size.  The difference in these valuations for each consumer type is ∆ui ≡ Ui – 
ui, reflecting how much they gain from trading up from the regular size to the large size.  
This bifurcation of consumer segments into value-conscious and health-conscious 
highlights in plain terms how different consumers, or the same consumers but in different 
circumstances, make purchasing choices over the amount of appealing-but-unhealthy food and 
drinks to consume where the value on offer for large sizes tempts some consumers, but health 
concerns help restrain other consumers to avoid excessive consumption of such goods.  
Empirical studies provide support for this distinction, showing that price-oriented consumers 
have a greater propensity to be overweight than less price-conscious consumers (Gandal & 
Shabelansky, 2010) and that obesity and unhealthy food and drink consumption rates tend to be 
higher amongst lower income consumers (Drewnowski & Specter, 2004).  Also, the context 
might matter with consumers, depending on their mood and circumstances, sometimes having 
the discipline to control their consumption levels and at other times susceptible to attractive price 
deals enticing them to consume higher levels (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981).   
The differences between the two consumer segments are formally as follows: 
(1) Value-Conscious Consumers:  These customers seek value for money in their purchases and 
are willing to put aside health concerns to consume large quantities of tasty-but-unhealthy food 
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and drinks if doing so provides good value and hedonic pleasure from their consumption 
(Raghunathan, Walker Naylor, & Hoyer, 2006; Vermeer, Alting, Steenhuis, & Seidell, 2009).  
Specifically, they are willing to pay a modest amount, uV, for the regular size of the sugary drink 
but value a large size and are willing to pay significantly more, up to UV with UV ≫ uV, when 
they gain a lot of extra consumption pleasure from a significantly enlarged quantity while willing 
to ignore any longer term effects on their health and waistlines when the large quantity 
represents good value over the smaller size. 
(2) Health-Conscious Consumers:  These consumers think about the calories and try to consume 
in moderation so are willing to pay a premium price, uH, for rationing consumption in small 
portions of sugary drinks and other unhealthy high-calorie products compared to Value-
Conscious consumers, so uH > uV (Wertenbroch, 1998; Wansink & Huckabee, 2005). They have 
major concerns about negative delayed consequences of consuming unhealthy foods and drinks 
in excessive amounts and so their incremental gain in utility from trading up from the regular 
size to the large size is less than that of value-conscious consumers, so ΔuH < ΔuV.  
Consequently, they are willing to pay little or no more for a larger size of such products 
compared to the regular size to the extent that the incremental value to them is less than the 
incremental supply cost, so 0 ≤ ∆uH < ∆c, and they will only buy the large size if the price 
difference with the small size is less than the valuation difference, that is if ∆p < ∆uH.  
For completeness, assuming that uH > c and UV > C ensures that both regular and large 
sizes are feasible in the market.  Also, while the Health-Conscious are willing to pay more for 
the regular size but that their incremental utility gain from trading up to the large size is less 
compared to the Value-Conscious, that is respectively uH > uV  and ΔuH < ΔuV, the model allows 
for either segment to have the higher (absolute) valuation on the large size (recognizing that the 
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Value-Conscious have a stronger relative preference for the large size over the regular size but 
from a lower base so they might not necessarily be willing to pay more than the Health-
Conscious for the large size, such as when they face a tight budget constraint). 
The vendor’s objective is to maximize profits through choosing the range and prices of 
sizes offered, that is whether for regular-only, large-only or regular-and-large size offerings, 
when knowing the proportions of each customer type and their valuations (i.e., known values of 
, uV, uH, UV and UH), but not individuals’ preferences (so ruling out direct price discrimination).  
As the next section shows, the vendor can use value size pricing to entice customers to self-select 
by their type (i.e., reveal their nature through their purchasing decision) when offering both sizes. 
4.    Size Range Choice and Pricing Strategy 
This section derives the vendor’s profit-maximizing choice of product sizes to offer and 
corresponding pricing strategy in the absence of any policy measures influencing the vendor’s 
behavior.  The Appendix contains the proofs to all formal propositions and corollaries.   
4.1. Offering Regular Size Only  
The vendor has two pricing options to extract consumer surplus when selling only the 
regular size.  First, the vendor could sell the regular size at a high price of uH only to the Health-
Conscious consumers (as this price exceeds how much Value-Conscious consumers would be 
willing to pay, given that uV < uH).  Alternatively, the vendor can sell the regular size at a lower 
price of uV to attract all consumers.  Denoting the former as selling option R1 and the latter as 
selling option R2 then, as the first two rows of Table 1 show, option R1 generates a profit of (1 – 
)(uH – c) while option R2 generates a profit of uV – c, with the former greater (respectively, 
less) than the latter when uV – (1 – )uH < (respectively, >) c.  Thus, the vendor is more 
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(respectively, less) likely to prefer selling option R1 over option R2 the greater (smaller) is the 
value of uH and c and the smaller (greater) is the value of  and uV. 
4.2. Offering Large Size Only 
As a direct alternative to only selling the regular size, the vendor could choose to sell just 
the large size and use one of four pricing options to extract consumer surplus, depending on 
whether the vendor wants to supply one or both consumer segments and depending on whether 
the reservation price for value-conscious consumers buying a large size is greater or less than 
that for the health-conscious consumers.  Labelling these selling options as L1 to L4, Table 1 
shows the outcomes and conditions for these four selling options.   
Table 1 here. 
Taking first the situation where UV  UH, the vendor has the choice of using selling option 
L1 and selling to both segments by setting the price at UH or using selling option L2 and selling 
at UV to exclude the health-conscious and only sell to the value-conscious.  The former 
(respectively, the latter) offers more profit if UH – UV > (<) (1 – )C.  Next, taking the opposite 
situation where UV < UH, then the vendor has the choice of using selling option L3 and selling to 
both segments by setting the price at UV or using selling option L4 and selling at UH to exclude 
the value-conscious and only sell to the health-conscious. The former (respectively, the latter) 
offers more profit if UV – (1 – )UH > (<) C. 
4.3. Offering Both Regular Size and Large Size 
Rather than just selling one or the other of the two sizes, the vendor could choose to offer 
both sizes.  This choice would only make sense to the vendor if one consumer segment buys one 
size while the other consumer segment buys the other size (as otherwise the vendor might as well 
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just sell one size in the absence of any kind of framing or other psychological advantage from 
offering a decoy product that nobody buys).  Offering both sizes presents two possibilities, with 
either the Value-Conscious buying the large size and the Health-Conscious buying the regular 
size or vice versa, and the challenge for the vendor is to devise a selling strategy which ensures 
segmentation in the desired way with consumer types self-selecting based on what they see as 
being the most attractive size choice for the given prices.   
The former possibility entails distinguishing between two cases, which Table 1 shows 
respectively as the vendor using selling options RL1 and RL2.  When UV  UH, RL1 allows the 
vendor to achieve segmentation in the desired way by pricing the small size at p = uH (which 
serves to exclude the Value-Conscious buying the small size since then p > uH) and pricing the 
large size at P = UV (which serves to exclude the Health-Conscious buying the large size since 
then P  UH).  When UV < UH, the vendor’s problem is to price the large size sufficiently low to 
attract the Value-Conscious, which at most can be P = UV, but since this level is less than UH 
then in order to deter the Health-Conscious buying the large size the price gap with the small size 
will need to be not more than their value difference, that is p  ∆uH.  Accordingly, the vendor 
can achieve the targeted segmentation using RL2 with the regular size price at p = UV – ∆uH, and 
so, with P = UV, minimizing the necessary price gap, with p = ∆uH.  
The second possibility entails no pricing option available to the vendor that will result in 
the Value-Conscious buying the regular size and the Health-Conscious buying the large size, 
observing that only with p  uV would the Value-Conscious buy the regular size but at this price 
nothing prevents the Health-Conscious also buying that size and the vendor is unable to entice 
them to buy the large size without also enticing the Value-Conscious to do so as well.  
Specifically, the Health-Conscious require P < UH to buy the large size but that means P < UV 
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when UV  UH (so the Value-Conscious would then also opt for the large size) or the price would 
need to be in the range UV < P < UH to deter the Value-Conscious buying the large size when UV 
< UH but that would entail p > ∆uV which by the assumption that ∆uV > ∆uH implies p > ∆uH 
so the Health-Conscious would opt for the regular size since this size offers better value to them 
(i.e., neither type of consumer would buy the large size). 
4.4. Optimal Selling Strategy 
Comparing the amount of profit and consumer surplus that each selling option can extract 
from the different consumer types determines the vendor’s optimal selling strategy shows that 
the vendor’s optimal selling strategy depends on whether or not the willingness to pay of the 
Value-Conscious for a large size, UV, is larger or smaller than that of the Health-Conscious, UH:  
PROPOSITION 1.  The optimal selling strategy for the vendor is:  
(a) When UV  UH, sell both sizes using RL1 if (1 – )(uH – uV) > (∆c – ∆uV); otherwise sell 
only the regular size using R2.  
(b) When UV < UH, sell both sizes using RL2 if (UV – C) > (1 – )(UH – UV) and if (1 – 
)(uV – uH) > (∆c – ∆uV); otherwise, sell only the regular size using R1 if uV – (1 – 
)uH < c or use R2 if instead uV – (1 – )uH > c. 
Two immediate implications follow about the way that the vendor’s selling strategy can 
segment the consumer types into buying different portion sizes by the menu of prices offered: 
COROLLARY 1. With optimal dual-size pricing, the vendor offers the large size at a bargain price 
to attract the Value-Conscious yet put off the Health-Conscious. 
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COROLLARY 2. The vendor only uses the large size as a segmentation device to split the 
consumer types and never uses the large size to attract both consumer types. 
These results provide a rationale for why a drinks vendor could employ value size pricing 
to sell a regular size at a high price with a high margin to Health-Conscious consumers while 
offering a bargain deal on a large size sold with a substantial quantity discount that entails a low 
or even negative incremental margin to entice Value-Conscious consumers to buy the large size. 
The amount of discount the vendor can afford increases as the Health-Conscious customers place 
less additional value on the large size over the regular size. In the extreme, when they place no 
additional value on the large size, so ∆uH = 0, then the vendor may even offer the large size at no 
additional charge over the regular size when UV < UH.  For example, this situation might arise 
where Health-Conscious customers are completely satiated by consuming the regular size so see 
no benefit in taking a large size even for the same price.  In such circumstances, the vendor could 
just charge a flat fee and let consumers make their own choice of how much they wish to 
consume (e.g., as with a self-service soda fountain where the quantity taken is not monitored or 
with the offer of free refills). 
5. Value Size Pricing and Economic Inefficiency   
Defining total economic welfare purely as the sum of profit and consumer surplus, so 
leaving aside the negative health effects of excessive consumption, Table 2 shows the welfare 
levels for each of the four selling options that feature in the vendor’s optimal selling strategy 
from Proposition 1. 
Table 2 here. 
Comparing the profit and economic welfare levels across the selling options (from 
respectively columns 2 and 5 of Table 2), reveals that the private interests of the vendor can 
conflict with societal interests:  
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PROPOSITION 2.  A vendor can optimize profits by selling both sizes even when the added social 
value of offering the large size is negative (i.e., when both uV – c < 0 and uH – c < 0). 
Thus, on top of the public health damage to societal welfare, direct economic harm from 
value size pricing arises when the resources for providing the additional quantity in the large size 
cost more than the amount consumers are willing to pay.  For the vendor, though, value size 
pricing still adds to profits when the surplus extraction from the health-conscious consumers on 
the high regular price is sufficient to cover the additional costs of selling the large size at a 
bargain price to value-conscious consumers. In this sense, the vendor exploits the discipline of 
the health-conscious consumers and their reluctance to buy the large size. Society, though, would 
be better off if the vendor avoided using welfare-destroying value size pricing and instead sold 
only the regular size to all consumers. The absence of a private incentive to do this results in a 
social value destruction trap, suggesting a role for public policy intervention to address the harm 
of such value size pricing to economic welfare, over and above the public health damage caused 
by overconsumption of such drinks.  
6. Policy Measures to Reduce Overconsumption 
This section considers how the vendor would respond to different policy interventions to 
see if this changes outcomes in a socially desirable manner by reducing or even eliminating 
purchases of large-size drinks.  The focus is on the two most currently debated policy measures 
in the form of a portion cap rule and a soda tax. 
6.1. Calibrating Parameters 
The results from Propositions 1 and 2 apply to any specific quantities for the regular and 
large size.  However, calibrating the parameters allows for making straightforward comparisons 
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to provide clear and useful insights.  First, consider the large size as simply a multiple of the 
regular size and for convenience take the simplest case where the large size is exactly double the 
quantity of the regular size, so the regular size is one unit and the large size is two units.  Second, 
assume diminishing returns in the valuations for both consumer types but more so for the value-
conscious to fit with the prior assumptions that uV < uH but uV > uH, and accordingly assume 
for the 2:1 portion size ratio that uV < UV < 2uV and uH  UH < 2uH with ½ < uV/UV < uH/UH.  
Third, allow for the possibility of economies of scale in respect of the costs of different drink 
sizes (e.g. from having similar labor serving costs) such that c < C  2c for this 2:1 size ratio. 
6.2. Portion Cap Rule (Large-Size Ban) 
Consider the introduction of a portion cap rule which bans the use of the large-size cup so 
that the maximum cup size that the vendor could use to serve drinks is the regular-size cup.  The 
vendor could respond in one of three ways in ceasing to sell drinks in large-size cups.  First, the 
vendor could sell the regular size at a constant unit price, p, but allow consumers to buy two 
units if they want, so the volume-equivalent price of the large size would be double of the regular 
size, that is P = 2p.  Second, the vendor could sell the regular size with the offer of a free refill, 
so the price on the volume-equivalent of the large size is the same as that of the regular size, that 
is P = p, which makes the vendor’s pricing options analogous to selling a large-size only (on the 
basis that all consumers would accept the free refill when the incremental valuation gain is 
positive, i.e., ui > 0), and so a choice between L1, L2, L3 and L4 (from Table 1).  Third, the 
vendor could use multiple-unit pricing to sell the regular size at a given price while offering a 
bundle deal for buying an additional unit in the form “buy one for p or buy two for (2 – d)p”, 
where 0  d  1 is the discount rate on the second unit, and therefore the volume-equivalent price 
on the large size is P = (2 – d)p.   
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Of the three options, the third one is the most attractive to the vendor because it offers the 
greatest flexibility, and indeed subsumes the first and second options as special cases with 
respectively d = 0 and d = 1.  More importantly for the vendor, the third option with multiple-
unit pricing allows for precisely-equivalent selling options to RL1 and RL2.  This counter 
measure then allows the vendor to secure almost the same profit level in selling two regular sizes 
instead of one large size to value-conscious consumers, with the only difference being a slight 
loss due to raised costs of the amount (2c – C) arising from the loss of size economies.  In this 
way, the vendor sidesteps and essentially nullifies the ban with little scope for any reduction in 
consumption of the harmful sugary drinks.  Moreover, even with other vendor responses, 
consumption may not necessarily fall with a large-size ban and indeed could increase.  The 
following proposition summarizes these findings. 
PROPOSITION 3. (a) The vendor can effectively sidestep a large-size ban with minimal effect on its 
profit or on the volume sold by using multiple-unit pricing. (b) Other responses from the vendor 
might not reduce volume sold and could even allow for an increase as a result of the ban. 
The significance of Proposition 3 is that the strategic response by a drinks vendor can 
negate the intention of a large-size ban and indeed may make the situation worse, notably if the 
vendor moves to offering free refills.  In this context, an additional policy measure to ban free 
refills might further restrict the vendor’s options.  Interestingly, France has moved to ban free 
soda refills and other countries might follow suit (O’Connor, 2015).  However, the primary 
response from the vendor is likely to be multiple-unit pricing.  In this regard, Wilson, Stolarz-
Fantino, and Fantino (2013) empirically show that such deals could be highly attractive to 
consumers buying sugary drinks to the extent that buying multiple smaller-sized drinks could 
even be more desirable than an equivalent volume single large-sized drink.  Even so, scope exists 
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for a large-size ban to reduce consumption if consumers are reluctant to buy and carry two drinks 
(which explains the origin of supersizing – Critser 2003), and perhaps the visible absence of 
large-size drinks might reduce consumption norms towards consuming just a single regular-size 
drink by playing on consumers’ unit bias (Geier, Rozin, & Doros, 2006).   
6.3. Soda Taxes 
 Instead of seeking to reduce sugary drinks consumptions by restricting consumers’ choice 
of drinks sizes, an alternative policy measure could be through levying a soda tax on sellers in 
the hope that this tax would result in higher retail prices and then reduce consumer demand.  
Soda taxes are generally either in the form of a sales tax (usually as an added percentage on the 
retail price) or as an excise tax (usually as a monetary amount per weight or volume).  Practical 
differences can arise with collecting the taxes, where normally the vendor pays a sales tax (i.e., 
as an ad valorem tax), while usually the manufacturer/distributor pays an excise tax, who in turn 
can then pass on the higher costs down through the supply chain and eventually to consumers.  
 Going beyond the practicalities of collecting the tax, and acknowledging that the analysis 
here excludes supply chain considerations, the key difference to consider is how a percentage 
sales tax and a monetary amount per unit excise tax would respectively affect the vendor.  In the 
case of a sales tax, the vendor’s pricing options are still the same as those in Table 1 for p and P, 
but now representing post-tax prices facing consumers.  For a sales tax rate of t, dividing the 
revenue elements from column 3 of Table 1 by (1 + t) determines the revenues net of tax for the 
vendor and then subtracting total costs determines net profits.  Alternatively, a direct equivalence 
arises by multiplying the costs by (1 + t) to express profits in gross terms (before tax collection).  
As such, the effect of the sales tax for comparison purposes is to raise the vendor’s implicit costs 
by a fixed multiple of (1 + t).  In contrast, an excise tax would apply as a fixed amount of e cents 
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per unit and in direct proportion to the volume (or sugar content), so the vendor’s costs of selling 
a regular size effectively become c + e while the selling costs of selling a large size at double the 
size of the regular size are C + 2e.   
The two taxes are equivalent in taxing the regular size when they have exactly same 
effect on costs, that is when c + e = (1 + t)c, which holds when e = tc.  However, at this level the 
effect of the excise tax would be greater than the effect of the sales tax on the large size when 
size economies are present.  Observe that with e = tc then the selling costs under the excise tax 
become C + 2e = C + 2tc, where in contrast the selling costs with the sales tax are (1 + t)C, so the 
difference is t(2c – C) which is positive so long as the costs for selling the double-unit large size 
are less than double the selling costs for selling the single-unit regular size. 
 This difference might be subtle between the two types of tax but as the vendor’s selling 
costs affect the profits comparisons between the various selling options then they can affect the 
scope for which the vendor would be willing to offer a bargain deal on the large size and sell it to 
sell to Value-Conscious consumers.  With this consideration in mind, an effective soda tax would 
need to be set at a level sufficiently high to ensure that the vendor finds it more profitable to sell 
only the regular size drink, where drawing on the optimality conditions from Table 1, the 
following findings apply:  
PROPOSITION 4.  (a) A per unit soda tax can be more effective than a percentage sales tax in 
deterring the vendor from selling the large size; (b) the sufficient tax level may need to be set 
high to be effective, increasing in UV, uH, and c while decreasing in UH, uV, , and C. 
 If the tax rate or tax amount is set too low to alter the vendor’s choice of selling option 
then the vendor simply absorbs the tax and earns lower profits (given that it is already extracting 
all available surplus with the selling option and so has no scope to increase prices with that 
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selling option).  This means that rather than the tax having a linear effect on increasing prices, 
the effect will be fundamentally non-linear in the model here since the vendor will absorb higher 
taxes until they reach a point where a shift to a different selling option becomes more profitable.  
Accordingly, half measures will not suffice, and if policymakers want to see change then they 
will have to set a sufficiently high tax rate or amount to alter the vendor’s preference over which 
selling option to choose.  Anything less will not induce the necessary change in behavior. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Curbing consumption of large sugary drinks is now a key public health objective.  
However, debate rages over the most appropriate policy measures to use, especially regarding 
how best to control portion sizes.  Policy considerations necessarily require understanding the 
motives and strategic thinking of drinks vendors and the pricing and marketing tactics they can 
employ so that policy interventions can anticipate and take into account their responses.  As this 
paper shows, vendors can counter measures in many ways, making effective policy interventions 
a complex feat.  
Considerable opportunities exist for future work on this subject.  Fresh insights could 
emerge from relaxing some of this paper’s modelling assumptions to examine interesting 
questions about the possibility of using measures to encourage substitution towards less harmful 
non-sugared drinks and raising consumer conscience to influence purchasing preferences.  
However, the greatest challenge remains identifying win-win strategies of mutual benefit to both 
industry and the public, where the marketing of portion sizes adopts the principle that bigger is 
not necessarily better, and less can be more.  
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions and Corollaries 
Proof of Proposition 1: (a) When UV  UH, the five feasible selling options are R1, R2, L1, L2 
and RL1.  Comparing profits shows RL1 provides strictly more than R1, L1 and L2, and more 
than R2 if (1 – )(uH – uV) > (c – uV). (b) When UV < UH, the five feasible are R1, R2, L3, L4 
and RL2.  RL2 and R1 respectively provide strictly more profit than L3 and L4, while RL2 
offers more profit than R1 if (UV – C) > (1 – )(UV – UH) and more than R2 if (1 – )(uV – 
uH) > (uV – c), while R1 offers more (less) profit than R2 if uV – (1 – )uH < (>) c. 
Proof of Corollary 1: Follows directly from the optimal pricing choices where, in both dual-size 
cases with RL1 and RL2, uV < p  uH and ΔuH  Δp < ΔuV together with P = UV.  
Proof of Corollary 2: RL1 profit exceeds L1 and L2 profits, RL2 profit exceeds L3 profit, and 
R1 exceeds L4 profit, so other selling options dominate all four large-size-only options. 
Proof of Proposition 2: The optimality conditions for RL1 and RL2 (against R1 and R2) all 
allow ΔuV – Δc < 0 for a range of permissible parameter values.  First, when UV  UH, the 
optimality condition for RL1 to provide more profit than R1 is UV > C which holds as long as 
ΔuH – Δc > – (uV – c) < 0 and the optimality condition for RL1 over R2 is (1 – )(uH – uV) > (Δc 
– ΔuH) which holds as long as ΔuV – Δc > – (1 – )(uH – uV)/) < 0.  Second, when UV < UH, the 
optimality condition for RL2 over R1 is (UV – C) > (1 – )(UH  – UV), which holds if ΔuV – Δc 
< 0 as long as uV – c > (1 – )(UV – UH)/, and the optimality condition for RL2 over R2 is (1 – 
)(uV – uH) > (∆c – ∆uV), which holds if ΔuV – Δc > – (1 – )(uV – uH)/ < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3: (a) The vendor replicates RL1 and RL2 by respectively setting d = (2uH – 
UV)/uV) and d = (UV – 2uH)/(UV – uH), generating the same revenue as in the absence of the 
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large-size ban but raising total costs by (2c – C), which in turn affects the Proposition 1 
optimality conditions by the same amount. Segmentation profits decline but only by the extent of 
lost size economies, and consumption levels remain the same unless the size economies loss tips 
an already finely balanced profit comparison in favor of R1 or R2. (b) With constant-unit 
pricing, the vendor could still prefer to sell two units to value-conscious consumers when UV  
UH using p = UV – uV  uV to generate a profit of (1 + )(uV – c), offering more profit than R1 
if (1 + )uV – (1 – )uH – 2c > 0 and more than R2 if (1 + )uV – uV – c > 0, which are both 
possible if uV and  are high while uH and c are low. Alternatively, offering a free refill is 
equivalent to using L1, L2, L3 or L4 but which can still yield more profit than both R1 and R2 
when uV and uH are high and c is low, despite all consumers taking advantage of the free 
refill and thus overall consumption levels rising with the ban. 
Proof of Proposition 4: (a) Effective taxing requires the vendor finding it more profitable to sell 
only the regular size drink.  When UV  UH, RL1 yields lower profit than R1 and R2 respectively 
with a sales tax rate t > (UV – C)/C and t > [(1 – )(uH – uV) – (c – uV)]/[(c)] or an excise 
tax amount respectively e > (UV – C)/2 and e > [(1 – )(uH – uV) – (c – uV)]/.  When UV < 
UH, RL2 yields lower profit than R1 and R2 respectively with t > [(UV – C) + (1 – )(UV – 
UH)]/(C) and t > [(1 – )(uV – uH) + (uV – c)]/[(c)], or respectively with e > [(UV – C) 
+ (1 – )(UV – UH)]/(2) and e > [(1 – )(uV – uH) + (uV – c)]/.  With equivalent tax 
levels at e = tc, all four threshold levels are lower with an excise tax compared to a sales tax 
when 2c > C.  (b) Comparative statics show that the thresholds are increasing in UV, uH, and c 
while decreasing in UH, uV, , and C, so to the extent that the former are higher and the latter are 
lower then the tax level will need to be set high. 
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Table 1 
Pricing for Regular-Only, Large-only, and Regular-and-Large Size Offerings 
Selling Option Amount Sold Profit Selection criteria 
R1:  p = uH (no large size) 1 –  regular size (1 – )(uH – c) uV  – (1 – )uH < c 
R2:  p = uV (no large size) 1 regular size uV  – c uV  – (1 – )uH > c 
L1:  P = UH (no regular size) 
when UV  UH 
1 large size UH – C UH – UV > (1 – )C 
L2:  P = UV (no regular size) 
when UV  UH 
 large size (UV – C) UH – UV < (1 – )C 
L3:  P = UV (no regular size) 
when UV < UH 
1 large size UV – C UV – (1 – )UH > C 
L4:  P = UH (no regular size) 
when UV < UH 
1 –  large size (1 – )(UH – C) UV – (1 – )UH < C 
RL1: p = uH, P = UV 
(p = UV  – uH < ∆uV)  
when UV  UH 
1 –  regular size  
 large size 
(1 – )(uH – c)          
+ (UV – C) 
(1 – )(uH  – uV) > (∆c – ∆uV) 
RL2: p = UV  – ∆uH, P = UV 
(p = ∆uH < ∆uV)  
when UV < UH 
1 –  regular size  
 large size 
(1 – )(UV –∆uH –c)  
+ (UV – C) 
(UV – C) > (1 – )(UH  – UV); 
(1 – )(uV – uH) > (∆c – ∆uV) 
Table 2 
Welfare with Regular-Only and Regular-and-Large Size Offerings 
Selling Option Profit 
Surplus of 
Health-Conscious  
Surplus of  
Value-
Conscious 
Total Welfare 
R1:  p = uH (no large size) (1 – )(uH – c)     0 0 (1 – )(uH – c) 
R2:  p = uV (no large size) uV  – c (1 – )(uH – uV) 0 (1 – )uH + uV  – c 
RL1: p = uH, P = UV 
when UV  UH 
(1 – )(uH – c)           
+ (UV – C) 
    0 0 (1 – )(uH – c)           
+ (UV – C) 
RL2: p = UV  – ∆uH, P = UV 
when UV < UH 
(1 – )(UV –∆uH –c)    
+ (UV – C) 
(1 – )(UH – UV) 0 (1 – )(uH – c)           
+ (UV – C) 
 
